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1. Introduction  
New ways of generating and using electricity require significant reform of the inherited distribution 
system, raising questions of how to recover the costs both of the new investment required and of 
assets from traditional networks which may become wholly or partially ‘stranded’. We explore the 
inherent tension between providing appropriate incentives to those who can respond by taking 
initiatives necessary for future development, while protecting those who are unable or unwilling to 
respond to such incentives, at least in the short term, from excessive burdens. We describe a range 
of representative tariffs currently being levied or introduced, and simulate their effects on 
households with different demand and supply characteristics in a hypothetical system which must 
recover total distribution costs.  
Distribution network costs typically form 20-30% of household bills in Europe1 and the US 
(Burger et al., 2019), and cover local, lower voltage distribution services rather than higher tension 
transmission. Electricity distribution has been revolutionised by a range of technological innovation, 
in particular distributed generation and electric vehicle charging. By adopting renewable energy 
systems such as solar photovoltaic (PV) to generate their own electricity, households both make an 
important contribution to the transition towards cleaner energy, and enhance the flexibility 
potential of the distribution network (Cohen et al., 2016).  If households use less electricity at times 
of system peak, they may generate savings to the distribution system both in the short term, and for 
longer term investment requirements. Various incentives2 have encouraged renewable energy 
generation by households3, many incorporating a rather crude relationship with the associated cost 
savings, where a simple message may be an important part of encouraging adoption in the early 
stages of innovation. For example, net metering schemes that typically oblige utilities to buy any 
excess generation may charge very little for use of the distribution system to consumers who self-
generate across the billing period. Such schemes have been introduced in the early stages of solar 
PV adoption in Australia, Europe and the US (Cohen and Khermouch, 2013). 
However such generous incentive schemes to encourage adoption may leave any legacy and 
fixed forward-looking costs of the system uncovered, so either the Distribution System Operators 
experience falling revenue, or the costs may need to be recovered from a smaller base of 
households who have not installed micro-generation. Some of these non-adopters may have been 
excluded from participation by lower income, wealth or dwelling rights. Ironically, such issues are 
exacerbated if the incentives have successfully stimulated extensive solar PV penetration, and tariffs 
feature a high component of per kWh charge (Simshauser, 2016; Pollitt, 2018). Indeed the co-
existence of distributed generation and volume-based network tariffs triggers discussions on 
distributional fairness even in the absence of net metering schemes (Burger et al., 2019). 
This paper explores the distributional impacts of different tariff structures by simulating bills 
under each tariff for ‘notional’ households whose energy use profiles and ability to self-generate 
vary, within a stylised model where the costs of the distribution system are held constant. We 
observe a clear trade-off between incentives to self-generate renewable energy and distributional 
 
1 See, e.g., https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/data-portal/breakdown-electricity-bill. 
2 The incentive scheme concerned in this paper is net metering. For an analysis on how some other measures 
such as feed-in tariffs can facilitate renewable energy generation growth see Carley et al. (2017). 
3 This paper refers to solar PV as the typical self-generation technology and does not discuss how incentive 
schemes may differ by technology. For an analysis on technology-neutral and technology-specific schemes, see 
Lehmann and Söderholm (2018). 
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concerns across different tariff scenarios, and demonstrate how a net metering scheme may interact 
with tariff scenarios to aggravate the trade-off.   
The timeliness of this analysis is demonstrated by the European Commission’s4 recent call for “a 
fair deal for consumers”, alongside an increase both in energy efficiency and in the share of 
renewable sources (European Commission, 2016a). The proposals show the opportunities and 
challenges facing distribution networks, and highlight potential conflicts between sustainability, cost 
recovery and fairness.  Resolving these tensions is essential to achieve a smooth transition to cleaner 
energy.5 In the UK, the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) has consulted on removing 
certain incentive schemes for distributed generation and changes to network tariffs that recover 
both forward-looking and residual costs “so that costs are shared fairly now and in the future”.6  
Similar conflicting objectives are experienced in the US (Borenstein, 2016). Our findings offer some 
insights on tariff choices. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant concepts of fairness and associated 
literature on designing distribution network tariffs. Section 3 summarises the major existing charging 
methodologies and their applications, both in Europe and in North America, before presenting the 
framework for our simulation analysis. Section 4 presents and discusses the results, and Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Concepts of fairness and relevant literature  
Fairness is often linked to cost reflectivity, which can be seen as economically efficient from two 
perspectives. From the network point of view, if a consumer pays the costs of her supply, her 
participation is neither a burden nor a bonus for the rest of the network. From her individual 
perspective, she makes decisions about consumption (in this case whether to become connected to, 
stay connected to, and use the distribution network, at what times and on what terms and whether 
to install and use self-generation system) according to the costs that she imposes on the network. It 
follows that a ‘fair’ price paid by a network user should reflect the additional (or marginal) cost 
imposed on the network. Such marginal cost pricing should in principle apply to all margins, 
including those for recovering the costs of initial connection, maintaining connection, providing 
sufficient capacity to meet maximum demand on the system and transporting the electricity at times 
of varying congestion. Prices based on long-run marginal costs are more stable and provide long-
term investment signals, while those based on short-run marginal costs send signals for efficient 
short-run consumption decisions and are particularly important if network capacity is itself fixed and 
liable to congestion so that demand management may be required (Borenstein, 2016). 
However, marginal cost pricing may not achieve full recovery of electricity distribution costs for 
three main reasons. First, distribution networks exhibit economies of scale and/or density, i.e. 
average costs are lower, the more consumers are attached to the system, and are therefore above 
the marginal cost of supply. Second, some ‘unallocated’ costs may be difficult to categorise because 
they are not attributable to any particular activity or user. Third, there may be ‘legacy’ costs 
 
4 https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union/clean-energy-all-europeans. 
5 The Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) (2018) reflects this priority in its own strategic objectives, 
namely to “build consumer confidence in the market by ensuring all consumers benefit in a fair way, notably 
through the efficiency of the network tariff, and promote the participation of consumers without 
discrimination between consumers/prosumers.” 
6  See https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/targeted-charging-review-minded-decision-and-
draft-impact-assessment. This particular consultation focuses on residual charges, while our analysis also 
includes forward-looking costs.  
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inherited from past system design, which are not affected by users’ current decisions, widening the 
gap between forward-looking marginal and average costs.   
One traditional approach to identify the ‘optimal’ departure from marginal cost pricing to 
recover full costs is based on minimising demand distortions, so price reflects the demand 
responsiveness or elasticity of an individual user (or a group of users). Such Ramsey pricing (1927) 
almost always raises significant distributional concerns, since it imposes price discrimination, and 
charge higher mark-ups for ‘essential’ consumption (where demand is less responsive, and therefore 
‘distorted’) than for more discretionary consumption. Moreover, like many necessities, electricity 
expenditure increases with income, but less than proportionately, so that low-income households 
tend to devote a higher proportion of their expenditure to energy than do high-income households 
(Levell and Oldfield, 2011; Deller and Waddams, 2015).7  Therefore, even uniform percentage 
increases in price impose a higher proportionate burden on the low-income households. Introducing 
a fixed charge would be even more regressive.8  
Distribution networks have traditionally been dominated by users relying exclusively on the 
network for electricity supply, and costs have been mainly recovered through a volume-based 
charge. Since users within a certain group have previously tended to have similar electricity demand 
profiles, the use of volume-based tariffs  could be justified, even though it did not directly reflect the 
capacity-driven nature of network costs (Azarova et al., 2018). As supply and demand patterns 
change, and the relationship between peak and volume demand diverges, tariffs need to become 
more reflective of peak demand as the main driver of network costs (Eurelectric, 2016), and a flat 
volumetric rate is unlikely to be efficient or ‘fair’.9 Some studies find that most households with solar 
PV remain connected to the grid and use only slightly less peak capacity than the other households 
(Simshauser, 2016), while others argue that under the current centralised system small scale 
generation would entail efficiency losses that can increase, rather than decrease, costs (Schill et al., 
2017). A number of relevant questions thus arise: is it fair for users who impose different costs on 
the network to pay the same price? Is it fair for users who self-generate and remain connected to 
the grid to receive substantially lower bills when they may make similar demands on the system’s 
capacity at peak as other users? Is it fair that as a result of lower bills for micro generators, others 
pay more? 
Capacity-based and Time-of-Use (ToU) tariffs may be appropriate instruments to resolve some 
of the conflicting objectives. Since higher network costs are associated with peak demand, capacity-
based and ToU tariffs, each associated (in different ways) with peak demand, can give more 
appropriate cost signals than a flat volumetric tariff, helping to optimise the use of networks and 
enhance flexibility. They can also neutralise the impact of variations in volumetric consumption on 
DSOs’ revenues as adoption of renewable energy systems grows, and so mitigate or avoid cross-
subsidy between consumer groups.  
 
7 European Commission (2016b) states that “In 2014, the lowest income households in the EU spent close to 9% 
of their total expenditure on energy.” See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-3986_en.htm.  
8 General taxation can be another way to meet the difference and might be viewed as fair in the sense that the 
tax and benefits system of a country would presumably be designed to reflect the distributional priorities. 
However taxes themselves cause inefficiencies elsewhere in the economy, and support of energy systems 
through taxation raises issues of state aid. They are also challenging to administer if distribution systems are 
privately owned. 
9 Currently distribution tariffs for households in the Europe are mainly based on volumetric usage, not peak 
demand. 
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There are other aspects of tariff design and reform that are relevant to distributional justice 10 . 
For example, it could be argued that any cost allocation should lead to neither sudden and sharp 
increases, nor significant fluctuations, in bills, because this would ‘cloud’ the price message and the 
efficiency characteristics of consumer response. Similarly it could be argued that the bills of 
consumers within the same tariff class should change by similar amounts, and any changes should 
not disadvantage consumers who are poor and vulnerable, unless adequate support can be provided, 
either through tariffs or other means.11 This latter requirement may be a particular challenge when 
previous tariffs have not been broadly cost-reflective, or if changes on the demand or supply side 
result in substantial alterations in the nature and pattern of costs. 
The relevant literature on network cost recovery can be considered in three broad groups. The 
first group considers the principles of charging, some of which we have discussed earlier on, 
particularly where there are stranded or residual costs. Borenstein (2016) provides an excellent 
review of the concepts of fairness involved in enforced departure from efficient pricing as 
represented by social marginal costs, for example through recovery of fixed costs, and identifies 
potential tensions between raising prices in a way that minimises demand distortions and taking 
account of potential adverse distributional effects across the whole electricity supply chain.   
The second group explores the application of such principles across the entire electricity supply 
chain, taking account of changing supply and demand patterns. Several papers apply the principles 
of fairness and cost reflectivity as the electricity sector changes from a traditional centralised system 
to one employing new distributed technologies. Pérez-Arriaga et al. (2017) focus on the importance 
of prices to guide the individual decisions of network users and the need to reduce inefficient 
barriers and wasteful competition. They propose that tariffs should be technology neutral and 
symmetrical, with improved granularity of signals in terms of time and location, and that residual 
costs should not affect incentives. Batlle et al. (2018) and Burger et al. (2019) both follow their 
discussions of general principles with proposals to redesign two specific tariffs, in Spain and the US, 
recommending a compromise between efficient price signals and distributional impacts.  
The third group focuses on the electricity distribution part of the supply chain, focusing on 
forward-looking costs or those inherited from past decisions, or both. The increasing significance of 
distributional issues in solar PV incentives as adoption rates increase is emphasised by Pollitt (2018), 
who draws attention to the more general difficulty of meeting efficiency, revenue recovery and 
distributional objectives simultaneously. Eid et al. (2014) emphasise the need for clearer incentives 
for solar PV, and consequent distributional concerns for those without such facilities who do not 
benefit from lower bills. Simshauser (2016) focuses on rate instability, and recommends a capacity-
based demand charge as an efficient, cost-reflective, stable and equitable pricing mechanism within 
a rate-of-return based regulatory structure. Passey et al. (2017) focus on how demand charges can 
be adjusted to increase their cost reflectivity.  Brown et al. (2015) review a wide range of tariffs to 
ensure economic efficiency in distribution network services, incorporating both efficient long-run 
marginal costs and recovery of residual costs, and highlight the potential tension between efficiency 
and cost recovery, echoing other papers in appealing for greater transparency in how these 
objectives are balanced. Schittekatte et al. (2018) focus on recovering sunk network costs without 
distorting consumer response and investment incentives for distributed generation, again 
 
10 For some other alternative interpretations of fairness, see Brown et al. (2015). 
11 For example, through the use of social tariffs. While social tariffs will not be discussed in the rest of this 
paper, the idea is that, regardless of the provision of social tariffs, it may be desirable if the overall distribution 
tariff design could reflect some considerations of fairness and equity.  
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emphasising the increasing challenges as systems mature, and identify both efficiency and fairness 
issues.  
In terms of methodology, a number of studies have simulated outcomes to explore the effects 
of network tariffs on household bills, either using hypothetical households or actual consumption 
data from a sample of households. Brown et al. (2015) and Azarova et al. (2018) examine 
distributional effects of electricity tariffs, but do not consider the possibility of distributed 
generation. Burger et al. (2019) consider distributed generation and analyse bill impacts of tariffs 
across different socioeconomic groups, but do not consider net metering. Compared to the few 
studies analysing the combination of net metering and tariff design (Eid et al. 2014; Picciariello et al., 
2015; Schittekatte et al. 2018), our simulation covers a wider range of tariff scenarios drawn from 
principles and experience, and directly demonstrates the trade-off in the absence and presence of 
net metering. This allows us to examine policy changes beyond separating net metering and 
volumetric charges (or removing net metering), and to address the core issue of designing fair 
network tariffs that are future-proof. We suggest that such tariffs are likely to contain multiple 
components (with the volume component being moderate) and/or a ToU element. 
3. Developing a stylised tariff design model from current distribution tariffs 
This section assesses a series of stylised network tariffs for recovering distribution network costs, 
based on the principles and context discussed in previous sections. The choice of stylised tariffs are 
based on a number of representative tariffs already in use or proposed.  
3.1 Tariff scenarios 
Network tariffs generally vary according to tariff classes12, tariff components, and charging bases.13   
Most current network tariffs reflect three main components, used either alone or in combination: 
fixed (€/period); capacity (€/kW); and volume (€/kWh). Fixed component tariffs are commonly 
known as standing service charges 14, and are independent of consumers’ maximum demand and 
consumption volume. Capacity component tariffs charge consumers for the availability of a 
maximum load, either ex ante (based on the maximum contractual capacity), or ex post (based on 
consumers’ actual peak demand over a period) or a mixture of both. Volume component tariffs 
charge consumers according to their total usage of electricity from the grid.  
Within each component, charges may be linear or non-linear.15 ToU tariffs charge different 
prices per volume of electricity consumed at different times of the day, week or year (e.g. peak, 
shoulder, off-peak), and provide an alternative approach to charging directly for capacity. Static ToU 
tariffs pre-define the charging time periods and rates, which remain fixed until the next adjustment; 
 
12 Tariff classes can be defined by voltage level (kV) as a measure of capacity (e.g. high, medium or low), 
customer types (e.g. household or industrial), metering (e.g. whether metered or unmetered and type of 
meter), geographic zone, etc. Consumers belonging to different classes may face different tariff constituents 
and levels. In the EU, tariff classes are mostly defined by voltage level (European Commission, 2015). 
13 Individual tariff components and charging bases, and their relative advantages are summarised in Appendix I. 
14  This is different from an up-front fee, which is typically a one-off charge associated with initial connection to 
the system.  
15 For example, under an Increasing Block Tariff (IBT), the price paid for each unit (consumed, or of capacity) 
increases when volumetric consumption or capacity reaches a particular predetermined level, or block. The 
practical challenges of IBTs regarding their designs and consumer responses are discussed in depth in Lu et al. 
(2019), albeit in the context of residential water consumption. The fixed component may vary between tariff 
classes. We focus on a single class, namely household consumers.   
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while dynamic ToU tariffs can vary on an hourly or daily basis or more frequently in response to real-
time network congestion (e.g. corresponding to half-hourly settlement in the wholesale market16).  
Distribution network tariff structures are changing in response to new supply and demand 
patterns and vary considerably across jurisdictions. We have selected a broadly representative suite 
of cases to reflect the tariff structures outlined above, including four EU states, one EEA state and 
one US state.17 Table 1 summarises the key features of tariff structures in each state and whether 
net metering is an option, and the organisation which carries the main responsibility for setting 
distribution tariffs, i.e. whether a national regulatory agency (NRA) or a DSO. These examples 
provide the basis of our stylised tariff scenarios. 
Case Tariff component Tariff charging basis  Net 
metering 
Main 
responsibility in 
setting tariffs 
Fixed Capacity Volume  
(weight) 
Non-linear  Time-of-Use  
Italy YES YES YES (66%) YES NO YES NRA 
Portugal NO YES YES (62%) NO YES NO NRA 
Romania NO NO YES (100%) NO NO NO NRA 
The Netherlands YES YES NO (0%) NO NO YES NRA and DSOs 
Norway YES  NO YES (70%) NO NO NO DSOs 
California (PG&E) YES NO YES (n/a) YES YES YES DSO(PG&E) 
Table 1. Key features of household tariffs in selected cases  
The suite of stylised tariffs to be examined, derived from principles and practice, is described in 
Table 2. These stylised tariffs vary in the weights applied to each tariff component.18 In addition, 
30F70Vt is a ToU tariff, under which peak time price is assumed to be five times higher than the off-
peak price. We also include an option for net metering for households who feed excess generation 
into the grid.  
Tariff 
scenario 
Fixed 
component 
(€/year) 
Capacity 
component 
(€/kW) 
Volume 
component 
(€/kWh) 
ToU Net metering 
when available 
100V - - 100% NO YES 
100C - 100% - NO NO 
100F 100% - - NO NO 
30F70V 30% - 70% NO YES 
30F70C 30% 70% - NO NO 
50C50V - 50% 50% NO YES 
20F40C40V 20% 40% 40% NO YES 
30F70Vt 30% - 70% YES YES 
Table 2. Stylised tariff scenarios 
3.2 Network and notional households  
We use a simplified set of parameters to describe the network usage and consequent costs across a 
small number of notional households with a range of different demand (and supply) patterns, 
 
16 Ofgem  is considering half hourly metering for households , see https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/retail-
market/market-review-and-reform/smarter-markets-programme/electricity-settlement. 
17 Case studies of household electricity distribution tariffs in these states are in Appendix II. 
18 Note that the tariff in Romania is 100% volume-based (100V). Norway uses a combination of 30% fixed 
component and 70% volume component (30F70V). The tariff scenario 30F70C has no volume component, 
which resembles the case of the Netherlands. Portugal uses a combination of capacity and volume 
components (close to 50C50V). The tariff scenario 20F40C40V features all three components, resembling the 
Italian case. 
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classified according to their various electricity use profiles. Table 3 shows how the eight households 
differ from each other in one or more ways regarding: 
• Annual contractual capacity (low, average or high),  
• Annual electricity consumption (very low, low, average or high), 
• Ratio of consumption at peak time (1/2, 2/3 or 1), 
• Whether there is any PV solar system installed; and, if so, 
• Whether the household is able to feed excess supply into the grid.  
As defined at the end of Table 3, we denote each household with an abbreviation. The first 
letter of each abbreviation refers to the level of contractual capacity (L, A, H); the next to the level of 
(net) volumetric consumption from the grid (vL, L, A, H); while an f at the end indicates that the 
household is able to feed surplus generation into the grid. Note that the three households with solar 
PV all withdraw very little from the grid.  
Household 
abbreviation 
Contractual 
capacity  
(kW/year) 
Volumetric 
consumption 
(kWh/year) 
 Ratio of 
consumption (kWh) 
at peak time  
Solar PV Amount fed into 
grid if allowed 
(kWh/year) 
LL Low  
(4) 
Low 
(1500) 
1/2 NO - 
HL High 
(10)  
Low  
(1500) 
2/3 NO - 
LH Low  
(4) 
High 
(5500)  
1/2 NO - 
HH 
  
High 
(10)  
High 
(5500)   
2/3 NO - 
AA Average  
(6) 
Average 
(3500)   
1/2 NO - 
LvL Low  
(4) 
Very low  
(500) 
1 YES 0 
HvL High  
(10) 
Very low 
(500) 
1 YES 0 
LvLf Low  
(4) 
Very low 
(500) 
1 YES 500 
Total consumption (kWh/year) 19000 
Total contractual capacity (kW/year) 52 
Average revenue per household (€/year) 200 
Total revenue (€/year) 1600 
LL – low capacity, low consumption; HL – high capacity, low consumption; LH – low capacity, high consumption; HH – 
high capacity, high consumption; AA – average capacity, average consumption; LvL –  low capacity, very low 
consumption; HvL – high capacity, very low consumption; LvLf – low capacity, very low consumption, able to feed 
into the grid if allowed 
Table 3. Notional households 
The specific values of different levels of contractual capacity and volumetric consumption 
shown in Table 3 are based on a typical household with a contractual capacity of 6 kW and an annual 
consumption of 3,500 kWh (European Commission, 2015). Households are assumed to have 
different ratios of peak time to total consumption.19 Those with high contractual capacity and no 
solar PV (HL and HH) display very peaky demand (a ratio of 2/3), and households with average or low 
contractual capacity and no solar PV are assumed to spread consumption more evenly across time (a 
ratio of 1/2). We assume that households with solar PV rely on the network for supply only during 
 
19 These ratios are for symbolic purposes only, since their calculation depends on how the peak period is 
defined. 
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peak time, so their peak to total consumption ratio is 1. Among the three households with solar PV, 
only LvLf generates surplus (500 kWh), which is fed into the grid during off-peak time. 20  Finally, total 
consumption is the sum of consumption from all households and total contractual capacity is the 
sum of capacity connection of all households. 
Network costs vary substantially across countries. We assume, for ease of calculation, that the 
average revenue required from each household to cover network costs is €200/year,21 and that 
there are equal numbers of consumers within each type of household. While this assumption is 
purely notional, and unlikely to hold in any particular case, the model can be adapted to particular 
circumstances as the proportions of each type of household varies across jurisdictions and over time. 
In our notional system, total revenue would be €1600/year, which could be interpreted as a 
regulated revenue cap. This forms the basis for the stylised tariffs derived for each combination of 
components in Table 2,22 and is used to simulate network bills for each of the eight notional 
households. For simplicity, we do not associate different costs with different tariff structures; since 
one objective of such tariffs is to reduce total system costs by offering efficient incentives, our 
example can be seen as an upper bound in terms of overall costs. 
We take advantage of our stylised model to compare the simulated bills within the overall 
revenue cap, and highlight general trends and key observations, rather than compare tariff options 
to any specific benchmark or existing tariff.  
4. Results and analysis  
We use the tariffs derived in the previous section to simulate bills of the hypothetical households 
under each tariff scenario, both excluding and including net metering.  
4.1 Bill variations with usage profile and tariff design 
We first consider the situation where households consume the electricity they self-generate, but 
cannot feed any surplus into the grid, i.e. LvLf is identical to LvL. The simulated bills for each of the 
remaining seven households under each tariff scenario are presented in Table 4. 
Bill  100V 100C 100F 30F70V 30F70C 50C50V 20F40C40V 30F70Vt 
LL 126.32 123.08 200.00 148.42 146.15 124.70 139.76 137.94 
HL 126.32 307.69 200.00 148.42 275.38 217.00 213.60 155.26 
LH 463.16 123.08 200.00 384.21 146.15 293.12 274.49 345.77 
HH 463.16 307.69 200.00 384.21 275.38 385.43 348.34 409.28 
AA 294.74 184.62 200.00 266.32 189.23 239.68 231.74 241.86 
LvL 42.11 123.08 200.00 89.47 146.15 82.59 106.07 103.30 
HvL 42.11 307.69 200.00 89.47 275.38 174.90 179.92 103.30 
LvLf 42.11 123.08 200.00 89.47 146.15 82.59 106.07 103.30 
Total 1600 1600 1600 1600 1600 1600 1600 1600 
LL – low capacity, low consumption; HL – high capacity, low consumption; LH – low capacity, high consumption; HH – high 
capacity, high consumption; AA – average capacity, average consumption; LvL –  low capacity, very low consumption; HvL 
– high capacity, very low consumption; LvLf – low capacity, very low consumption, able to feed into the grid if allowed 
Table 4. Simulated bills (€) 
 
20 While the selection of notional households means that each of them represents 12.5% of the population in 
our model, it should be noted that we do not imply equal weighting of these households in the wider 
population, or that 12.5% of the population can fed into the grid. 
21 The average total charge for a household consumer in EU Member States was about €172/year in 2013, see 
Figure 11 (p.126) in European Commission (2015). 
22 See Table A5 in Appendix III for specific rates charged under different tariff scenarios. 
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Based on Table 4, Figures 1 to 4 below illustrate the variation of household bills with electricity 
use and tariff design, and offer qualitative insights rather than quantitative determinations. Tariff 
100F generates an identical bill for each household, while 100V and 30F70V (similar to traditional 
volume based tariffs) each produces four different bills across household types, reflecting the four 
different levels of consumption which the households represent. Similarly, tariff 100C generates 
three different bills, while bills vary more when the tariff includes both capacity and volume 
components, such as 50C50V, 20F40C40V and 30F70Vt, because the tariff reflects more dimensions 
of usage. In practice, the marginal costs attributable to each component of the tariff (fixed, capacity, 
volume) vary both across distribution systems and over time, according to factors such as patterns of 
supply and demand (e.g. peakiness), density of consumers and maturity. Cost-reflective tariffs would 
generally include all three elements, but in different proportions.  
 
LL – low capacity, low consumption; HL – high capacity, low consumption; LH – low capacity, high consumption; HH – 
high capacity, high consumption; AA – average capacity, average consumption; LvL –  low capacity, very low 
consumption; HvL – high capacity, very low consumption; LvLf – low capacity, very low consumption, able to feed into 
the grid if allowed 
Figure 1. Simulated bills (€) for each household under each tariff scenario 
We focus particularly on the opportunity for self-generation by the two household types: LvL 
and  HvL, and consequent distributional impacts for all consumers.  Recall that each self-generator 
has very low level of consumption from the grid, but we assume that they rely on the grid during its 
peak period. Figure 2 illustrates the contribution to the total cost of €1600 by each of these 
households under each tariff. The contribution differs considerably across scenarios. Amongst all 
seven (non feed-in) tariffs, households with solar PV contribute least to distribution expenses under 
tariff 100V (only €42.11 each), and most under 100F, with a bill almost five times higher (€200 each). 
Furthermore, tariffs with a capacity component, such as 100C and 30F70C, charge large bills to 
household HvL who has high contractual capacity. Note that the ToU tariff 30F70Vt, although 
attaching a high weight to its volume component and no weight to the capacity component, 
generates a much higher bill for households with solar PV than does 100V because of its high unit 
price for peak consumption.   
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LvL –  low capacity, very low consumption; HvL – high capacity, very low consumption; LvLf – low 
capacity, very low consumption, able to feed into the grid if allowed 
Figure 2. Costs allocated (€) to 3 households with self-generation under each tariff scenario 
To explore distributional effects across the system, we compare the bill levied under each tariff 
for each household, shown in Figure 3. Since our model assumes no change in the total network 
costs from self-generation, the lower the costs allocated to households with solar PV, the more 
remain to be recovered from other households. Here the trade-off between incentives and 
distributional fairness is clearest: a volume-based tariff can offer a strong incentive to encourage the 
deployment of renewable energy systems, but if initial savings for the system as a whole are low and 
the cost of such an incentive is borne by the other consumers, then a volume-based tariff may lead 
to substantial redistribution. This may be a cause for concern if higher income households are more 
likely to undertake renewable energy investments,23 as bills for lower income households would 
increase as a result. A fixed tariff allocating the identical amount to all households may appear very 
equitable but does little to encourage efficiency or system flexibility, and is thus only attractive for 
recovering the residual and non-marginal parts of network costs. Tariffs that are more cost-reflective, 
including those which are capacity-based and ToU, may constrain potential redistribution in the 
presence of distributed generation, but can weaken households’ incentive to adopt renewable 
energy systems. Note that for some households, such as LL and AA, variations in their bills under 
different tariffs are relatively small, whereas for others, such as LH and HvL, the differences are 
considerable. Changing from one tariff design to another would have major effects on electricity bills 
for these households.  
 
 
23 CLEAR 2.0 (project in progress) identifies financial incapacity as one of the main barriers to adopting new 
technologies. See https://www.clear2-project.eu/. 
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LL – low capacity, low consumption; HL – high capacity, low consumption; LH – low capacity, high consumption; HH – 
high capacity, high consumption; AA – average capacity, average consumption; LvL –  low capacity, very low 
consumption; HvL – high capacity, very low consumption; LvLf – low capacity, very low consumption, able to feed into 
the grid if allowed 
Figure 3. Simulated bills (€) for each household 
In particular, each household’s the highest and lowest bills are generated by the ‘single 
component’ tariffs 100V, 100C, and 100F. The extent of difference between the highest and lowest 
bills of each household also varies considerably across households, reflecting both the overall size of 
their energy demand and whether one dimension of their demand is at a very high or very low 
extreme relative to the average. Households with such usage profiles may be prone to large bill 
increases (and decreases) under certain tariff reform programmes. In changing its residential tariff to 
be more capacity-based, the Netherlands implemented compensation schemes to ensure that 
households who could not reduce their contractual capacity did not suffer adverse impacts. 
4.2 Net metering 
In this sub-section we extend the analysis to consider the opportunity for household LvLf to feed 
surplus (500 kWh) into the grid during off-peak time, receiving remuneration at the same rate per 
volume24 as for electricity taken from the grid, through net metering. Since we assume that ‘credit’ 
for surplus generation is paid according to volume, LvLf would only receive remuneration in tariff 
scenarios which include a volume element.25 
We make two assumptions: first, that the electricity fed into the grid by household LvLf is not 
then supplied to others, i.e. total consumption from the grid remains at 19000 kWh/year as in Table 
3.  Secondly, that no remuneration is available from external financial resources but must be met 
endogenously, with a consequent impact on the bills of all households. Table 5 reports the simulated 
bills for each household and tariff scenario under these assumptions.  
 
 
 
 
24 In reality, net metering may not always take this simple form.  
25 We assume that any remuneration as a result of net metering is calculated through the volume component, 
which is indeed the case in practice, for example, in California and Italy. 
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Bill  100V 100C 100F 30F70V 30F70C 50C50V 20F40C40V 30F70Vt 
LL 129.73 123.08 200.00 150.81 146.15 126.40 141.12 138.55 
HL 129.73 307.69 200.00 150.81 275.38 218.71 214.97 156.00 
LH 475.68 123.08 200.00 392.97 146.15 299.38 279.50 348.00 
HH 475.68 307.69 200.00 392.97 275.38 391.68 353.35 412.00 
AA 302.70 184.62 200.00 271.89 189.23 243.66 234.93 243.27 
LvL 43.24 123.08 200.00 90.27 146.15 83.16 106.53 103.64 
HvL 43.24 307.69 200.00 90.27 275.38 175.47 180.37 103.64 
LvLf 0.00 123.08 200.00 60.00 146.15 61.54 89.23 94.91 
Total  1600 1600 1600 1600 1600 1600 1600 1600 
LL – low capacity, low consumption; HL – high capacity, low consumption; LH – low capacity, high consumption; HH – 
high capacity, high consumption; AA – average capacity, average consumption; LvL –  low capacity, very low 
consumption; HvL – high capacity, very low consumption; LvLf – low capacity, very low consumption, able to feed into 
the grid if allowed 
Table 5. Simulated bills (€) (including net metering) 
The effect of introducing net metering, i.e. the difference between the corresponding cells in 
Tables 5 and 6, 26 are illustrated in Figure 4 for the five tariffs which include a volume element. Since 
there is no volume component in tariffs 100C, 100F and 30F50C, they are not affected by net 
metering.  
 
LL – low capacity, low consumption; HL – high capacity, low consumption; LH – low capacity, high consumption; HH 
– high capacity, high consumption; AA – average capacity, average consumption; LvL –  low capacity, very low 
consumption; HvL – high capacity, very low consumption; LvLf – low capacity, very low consumption, able to feed 
into the grid if allowed 
Figure 4. Bill differences (€) due to net metering  
The size of bill reduction for household LvLf, the household taking advantage of net metering, 
varies considerably across tariff scenarios. As intuition suggests, remuneration increases in the 
weight of the volume component in the tariff scenario, with the exception of 30F70Vt. Although this 
tariff includes a 70% volume component, remuneration is reduced (to €8.39) because it is a ToU 
tariff so the bill reflects the household’s relatively high demand on the system at peak. LvLf gains the 
greatest reduction (€42.11) under tariff 100V, where it is able to offset completely the amount of 
electricity withdrawn from the grid with the amount injected and so faces a zero bill.  
 
26 See Table A6 in Appendix III. 
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Remuneration of household LvLf is funded by all other households, resulting in increases in their 
bills of between 0.25% and 2.8% in our simulation model. In particular, the two households with high 
volumetric consumption, LH and HH, together bear 60% of the burden of net metering, whereas a 
household with solar PV and thus very low volumetric consumption (Lvl or HvL) bears only about 3%. 
This cross remuneration to implement net metering exacerbates the trade-off between incentives 
and distributional fairness that arises from using a volume-based tariff as identified in Section 4.1. 
The combination of a volume-based tariff and net metering offers strong incentives for households 
both to self-generate and to feed into the grid, which may help towards environmental objectives, 
but could raise the costs for other households.  
While this stylised model is static, it reflects some realistic incentives for households to install 
renewable energy systems, self-generate and feed surplus into the grid, and so contribute to a clean 
energy transition and fulfil environmental obligations. However, there are clear adverse impacts for 
households who are unable or unwilling to install solar PV, and thus are faced with higher bills. Such 
households may have lower income and wealth than those who are able to take advantage of net 
tariffs, and social imbalance in benefits and costs may hamper the public acceptability of new supply 
technologies. 
5. Conclusion  
Our simulation results demonstrate how combining a tariff based mostly on volumetric consumption 
with net metering offers strong incentives to encourage deployment of renewable energy systems, 
but may substantially increase the bill burdens of households without solar PV. Such a combination 
can be appropriate when few households use solar PV and the policy priority is to promote the 
deployment of renewable energy in the residential sector. However, as solar PV installers scale up 
and the policy priority turns to reducing distributional burden and specific cross-subsidies, incentive 
schemes such as net metering may require modification so that tariffs become more cost-reflective 
and distributionally fair.  
We have outlined the arguments that to maximise efficiency and minimise forward-looking 
costs, consumers should make their energy decisions on the basis of the effect that their demand 
has on the total costs of the system. We consider the case where consumers who self-generate and 
feed electricity into the network does not necessarily save many costs if they still use the grid at 
times of system peak. Our simulations illustrate how basing charges on net volume use would result 
in very low charges for such consumers. Other users may have to bear the costs of their savings, 
which would impact particularly negatively on those who are unable to invest in new generation 
technologies or experience other impediments to participation. This example illustrates the 
potential tension between designing electricity tariffs to maximise incentives for adopting cleaner 
energy generation and potentially adverse distributional effects, especially in a system where 
distribution costs change little as a result of new patterns of use, and the cost of the incentives are 
met by other consumers within the system (i.e. there are few external subsidies).   
These tensions underline the importance of understanding the likely distributional impacts of 
introducing tariff reforms, especially in the presence of incentive schemes such as net metering and 
feed-in tariffs. Much depends on tariff design, in particular the balance between different charging 
components, as our simulation examples have shown. If we ignore the overall savings to the 
distribution system which we hope would result in the longer term from better aligned incentives 
and consumer responses, then reduced bills for households with self-generation imply higher costs 
paid by other consumers when the tariff in place is mainly volume-based. When the tariff becomes 
more nuanced and cost-reflective, such as through a capacity component or a ToU element, then 
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any cost reduction from self-generation depends on how peak demand is affected by self-generation. 
If self-generating consumers typically rely on the general grid for peak time supply, capacity and ToU 
tariffs do not guarantee savings for micro generators, and therefore can provide appropriate 
consumption signals while providing some mitigation of redistributive concerns.  
Moreover, the effects of any tariff change depend on how consumers respond in practice, and 
empirical evidence and application of such behaviour are critical to understanding both the 
incentives offered by and distributional effects of tariff changes. Three practical issues are relevant 
to tariff reform. The first follows directly from our simulation example, namely that not all 
consumers are in a position to respond to the incentives offered. As in any distributional matters, 
the way that initial wealth and opportunities are distributed has direct consequences for how 
markets work. It is important to understand what barriers to participation exist, and to address 
these in an equitable manner. Such inequality in opportunity is often related to financial and tenancy 
limitations: consequences in the energy market may be rooted in causes which lie beyond it, as do 
the best instruments to reduce such barriers. 
The second issue is that environmentally friendly tariffs cannot incentivise the desired change if 
consumers do not understand them. Even the most active consumers need to have confidence in 
clear signals about how their decisions affect monetary rewards, and be able to take action 
accordingly.  
The third issue, related to the first two, is the speed of change, both to enable those consumers 
who are in a position to do so to respond to the new incentives, and to enable appropriate 
protection for those who cannot react and may suffer adverse consequences. The challenge is not 
just how to redesign distribution tariffs so that they incorporate and incentivise the wider changes to 
the electricity system, but how to estimate the associated aggregate and distributional impacts on 
different consumer groups and confront any adverse consequence, especially for vulnerable 
consumers. This may suggest a gradual and smooth transition, even if it delays adaption to changes 
and benefits for the overall system. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I: Table A1 
Tariff component Fixed Capacity Volume 
ex ante ex post 
Advantage • Simple 
• Stable 
• Predictable  
• Signals that capacity has a 
price 
 
• Signals that capacity has a price 
• Cost reflective  
• Acceptable to consumers 
Disadvantage • Does not signal long 
term costs and so does 
little to encourage 
energy efficiency and 
system flexibility 
• Reflects capacity costs to a 
limited extent 
• Requires smart metering 
• Complex 
• Less predictable 
• Less acceptable to consumers  
• Does not reflect capacity costs 
• Can raise revenue uncertainty for 
DSOs 
Tariff charging basis 
for capacity and 
volume components 
Flat rate Non-linear Time-of-Use 
static dynamic 
Advantage • Simple 
• Acceptable to 
consumers 
• Can be designed to balance 
multiple objectives of 
affordability, conservation, 
efficiency and cost recovery 
• Mitigates congestion 
• Reflects capacity costs 
• Signals the value of flexibility   
• Benefits engaged consumers 
financially  
• Mitigates congestion 
• Reflects capacity costs 
• Signals the value of flexibility   
• Benefits engaged consumers 
financially 
• Can target specific system events on 
short notice  
Disadvantage  • Less cost reflective 
• Can over-incentivise 
self-generation which 
does not always 
synchronise with 
system peaks  
• Complex 
• Potential adverse 
consequences due to poor 
design or consumer 
understanding 
 
• Predicted peak times may not 
coincide with actual system peak 
• Does not allow for variability 
when peak conditions occur 
• Requires advanced metering 
• The risk of all consumers responding  
simultaneously to a single price 
signal 
• Traditional consumers who cannot 
change consumption pattern may 
face higher prices 
Table A1.  Tariff components and charging bases (based on CEER, 2017)
19 
 
Appendix II: Case studies 
At the core of practical tariff design and reform is the balance of different tariff components and/or 
combinations of the charging bases, and so it is useful to review the existing tariff structures in 
different jurisdictions, especially those attempting to accommodate new structures. This suite of 
cases is broadly representative, including four EU Member States, one EEA state and one US state, 
each tariff structure having a distinctive feature: 
• Italy, where non-linear volumetric tariffs have been a key feature, but are to be 
discontinued;  
• Portugal, where static ToU tariffs have been in place for a long time and dynamic ToU tariffs 
are to be introduced;  
• Romania, where distribution tariffs are based only on volume; 
• The Netherlands, where tariffs for household consumers are capacity-based and have no 
volume component;  
• Norway, where the capacity component is expected to be given more weight, and public 
consultation has taken place to gather industry and consumer feedback on different models 
of capacity charging;  
• California – Pacific Gas & Electricity (PG&E), where comprehensive tariff plans, including 
more household-specific designs, are in place and have been extensively studied. 
Italy27   
Overview  
Italy has 151 DSOs, which provide cost and quality data to the regulator, who in turn determines the 
distribution tariff structure. Tariff classes are first defined by customer types, namely household and 
business, and within each type further by voltage levels (low, medium, high and extra high). Tariffs 
for all classes contain fixed, capacity and volume components, but volume has a much higher weight 
in the design of residential tariff (66%) than in industrial tariffs (17%). Distribution and transmission 
tariffs are not separated for residential customers, and tariffs are not geographically differentiated. 
A social tariff scheme is implemented in the form of a discount for households with income lower 
than a fixed threshold. The cost of the scheme is not borne by DSOs.  
Key features in tariff components and charging bases  
In Italy, the capacity component is ex ante through the contractual capacity, and households can 
choose the size of the power limit: ≤ 3 kW or > 3 kW, to differentiate between low-use and 
intensive-use. The large majority of Italian households belong to the low-use group, and second 
homes that are not owner-occupied are charged as intensive-use households. One function of the 
smart meters installed in Italian homes is to ensure that the power delivered does not exceed the 
contractual limit, and to adjust the limit remotely upon any household request to change the limit.  
ToU is not used for any of the tariff classes, but Italian households have faced IBTs for their 
electricity bills since the early 1970s. The volume component of distribution tariffs has a progressive 
structure. The initial design included three blocks which over the years grew to six, but the sizes of 
 
27 The case study on Italy is based on information from Austrian Energy Market Commission (2014), European 
Commission (2015), CEER (2017), European Commission (2017), and RES LEGAL Europe http://www.res-
legal.eu/search-by-country/.   
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the initial blocks stay the same, as shown in Table A2. Block prices are different between the two 
household groups for the first two blocks: cheaper for low-use households and higher for intensive-
use households (and second homes that are not owner-occupied). 
Block Size (kWh) 
6 4,441 and above 
5 3,541 – 4,440 
4 2,641 – 3,540 
3 1,801 – 2,640 
2 901 – 1,800 
1 0 – 900 
Table A2. Block design of IBTs for Italian households 
IBTs for energy distribution were initiated in Italy for conservation purposes as they provide 
incentives to save energy through higher marginal prices at larger consumption levels. Although 
block prices are not directly linked to income, since the initial consumption is priced low, IBTs also 
address the issue of affordability. However, the fact that the sizes of the first few blocks have not 
changed for the past forty years suggests that such design of IBTs has not taken account of the 
radical changes in households’ socio-demographics and consumption patterns, and the development 
of technologies and the electricity sector in general.  
While IBTs are an equitable option in theory, they do not always serve their purpose in practice 
(Lu et al., 2019). The Italian Parliament and Government identified the existing IBTs for households 
as ineffective and outdated. In relation to consumers, the existing IBTs are considered to have 
hindered transparency and hence consumer responses to investment incentives and energy 
efficiency measures, as the block structure has made bills extremely difficult to understand.  
Tariff reform is under way to replace IBTs with linear tariffs28, to allow more flexibility to 
household consumers in defining their contractual capacity. Such a change may have negative 
distributional impacts for low-income households. 
Self-generation and net metering 
In Italy, consumers with small-scale self-generation of renewable energy are entitled to be 
connected to the national electricity grid upon request. All consumers generating up to 500 kW are 
eligible to submit an application. Plants commissioned before 31 December 2007 were only eligible 
if their generation capacity did not exceed 20 kW, and plants commissioned before 31 December 
2014 were eligible if their generation capacity did not exceed 200 kW. Net consumption is calculated 
once a year. If more energy is fed in to the network than is taken from it, plant operators are entitled 
to receive an economic compensation, which is calculated on the ToU basis. 
Portugal29  
Overview  
The national energy regulator determines and publishes distribution tariffs for the one national and 
ten local DSOs in Portugal. Tariff classes are defined by voltage levels: 
 
28 A similar reform took place in California in recent years, where a simplified block structure has been retained. 
See the case study on California for more details.  
29 The case study on Portugal is based on information from Apolinário et al. (2006), European Commission 
(2015), CEER (2017), European Commission (2017), and RES LEGAL Europe http://www.res-legal.eu/search-by-
country/. 
21 
 
• Standard low – typically households; 
• Special low – typically small business customers; 
• Medium – typically small industrial customers; 
• High – typically large industrial customers;  
Tariffs for all classes contain the same components, capacity and volume, but volume has a 
much higher weight in tariffs for households (62%) than tariffs for large industry (17%). Tariffs are 
not geographically differentiated. A social tariff scheme is applied to the network access tariff to 
enable an equal discount to be offered to all consumers, regardless of the contracted final tariff.  
Key features in tariff components and charging bases  
In Portugal, the capacity component is charged through contracted power for households. While 
both capacity and volume components are linear, the latter can be differentiated by static ToU. The 
options for households are no ToU, two-period ToU (peak and off-peak), and three-period ToU (peak, 
off-peak and super off-peak). Industrial customers are charged on a minimum four-period ToU for 
their energy consumption (peak, half-peak, off-peak and super off-peak), or more periods if they 
request it, together with variations between two seasonal periods.  
Static ToU tariffs have been used in Portugal for a long time, representing 80% of the total 
demand. To benefit further from demand-side flexibility and to promote more efficient use of the 
network, the Portuguese energy regulator has created the regulatory framework to introduce 
dynamic ToU. As part of the cost benefit analysis, a pilot project has recently started with volunteer 
industrial users. Such a gradual, phased approach avoids the potential adverse impact on some 
consumer groups who are unable to react to price signals. 
Romania30  
Overview  
Romania has eight DSOs. The Romanian Energy Regulatory Authority takes the main responsibility 
for setting distribution tariffs. DSOs may propose a change in the tariff for the regulator to access. 
Tariff classes are defined by voltage level (low, medium and high), which typically correspond to 
household, small industrial and large industrial, although no formal distinction is made between 
customer types. Households whose members earn an average income equal to or below the 
minimum wage may be eligible for social tariffs.  
Key features in tariff components and charging bases  
Romania is a special case where customers in all classes are charged only by the volume component. 
The pricing of the volume component is linear, although tariff levels differ across the eight DSO 
regions. Tariffs are not time-differentiated.  
The Netherlands31  
Overview  
 
30 The case study on Romania is based on information from Diaconu et al. (2009), European Commission (2015) 
and European Commission (2017). 
31 The case study on The Netherlands is based on information from European Commission (2015), CEER (2017) 
and European Commission (2017). 
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Eight DSOs distribute electricity in The Netherlands, and propose tariff structures to the regulator, 
who makes the final decision. Tariff classes are defined mostly by customer types, namely residential, 
small industrial and large industrial. Residential and small industrial customers are also defined as 
small users (connection size ≤ 3× 80 A). Tariffs for different classes contain different components: 
• Residential: fixed and capacity;  
• Small industrial: capacity;  
• Large industrial: capacity and volume.  
Tariffs are similar for customers belonging to the same class. A separate, nationally-uniform 
metering tariff is available for residential and small industrial customers; for large industrial 
customers the market for metering is liberalised. There is no social tariff in The Netherlands. 
Key features in tariff components and charging bases  
In The Netherlands, all tariff components used are linear within each tariff class. ToU is used to a 
limited extent for large industrial customers. One distinctive feature is that the combination of tariff 
components differs across tariff classes, and, in particular, there is no volume component for 
residential and small industrial classes. Such capacity-based tariffs were introduced in 2009 for 
greater cost reflectivity and efficiency, as well as to reduce administrative costs considerably through 
simplified billing.  
Small users are further divided into six capacity categories. As shown in Table A3, each category 
is assigned an ‘accountable capacity’ factor, which is lowest (0.05) in category 1 and increases to 50 
in category 6. The tariff level charged for each category is determined by the product of a general 
tariff (€/kW) set by ACM, the competition authority, and the respective category factor.  
However, the distributional impact of this tariff reform needed to be considered. Ceteris paribus, 
compared to volume-based tariffs, capacity-based tariffs would benefit households whose 
volumetric consumption is relatively high but connection capacity is relatively low; and would 
recover more costs from households whose volumetric consumption is relatively low but have high 
connection capacity. To mitigate the distributional impacts, such as sudden and large bill increases 
for some, households in The Netherlands were encouraged, through a reduction in connection fee, 
to lower their connection capacity. Those who could not reduce connection capacity were offered 
compensation, as their new bills would be significantly higher. However, because of the favourable 
conditions offered to consumers, the incomes of DSOs did not increase with the expected cost 
reduction. 
Customer 
category 
Capacity Accountable capacity 
factor  
1 ≤ 1×6 A on the switched network 0.05 
2 ≤ 3×25 A + all 1-phase connection  4 
3 3×25 A – 3×35 A 20 
4 3×35 A – 3×50 A 30 
5 3×50 A – 3×63 A 40 
6 3×63 A – 3×80 A 50 
Tariff level for each category is given by General tariff €/kW × factor 
Table A3. Capacity tariffs for small users in The Netherlands  
Self-generation and net metering  
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The market for solar PV is relatively mature in The Netherlands, with prosumers being defined and 
regulated in general Energy or Electricity law. The Electricity Act sets out residential prosumers’ right 
to feed self-generated electricity into the grid, for which grid operators must provide a contract to 
prosumers. Compensation to prosumers is determined by the net metering scheme. Under the net 
metering scheme, the electricity bill summarises how much electricity the prosumer has produced 
and the supplier has delivered, respectively, and the prosumer is only invoiced for the difference, i.e. 
net consumption. In order to participate in the scheme, the prosumer has to be a small user 
(connection size ≤ 3× 80 A), with electricity supplied to and extracted from the same connection. 
Norway32  
Overview  
The 131 DSOs in Norway have a high degree of freedom in designing network tariffs, which are 
subject to revenue caps set by NVE, the regulator, but not to detailed regulatory approval. Tariff 
class is defined by the voltage level to which a customer is connected. As a minimum, tariffs contain 
fixed and volume components, and a capacity component usually applies in addition for customers 
with high consumption (> 100,000 kWh/year) or high installed capacity (> 80 or 125 A). For small 
users the fixed component accounts for around 30% of the total network tariff on average. 
Key features in tariff components and charging bases  
While households in Norway do not currently face capacity charges, NVE intends to make capacity a 
mandatory component to be included by DSOs in their tariff designs, and that “capacity (kW) 
requirements are expected to be at least as important as energy (kWh) requirements”.  In order to 
achieve this objective, several models for capacity tariffs have been proposed: 
• Installed capacity (NOK/A or kW);  
• Subscribed capacity, with penalties for over-consumption, or use of smart meters to enforce 
the subscribed limit (the latter is similar to the Italian experience);  
• Measured capacity usage (NOK/kW);  
• ToU tariffs as an alternative to measured capacity.  
Relating these models to Table A4, installed and subscribed capacity refer to ex ante contractual 
capacity. For installed capacity, the charge would be a fixed annual fee, differentiated by the level of 
connection. Subscribed capacity would mean a certain amount of capacity at a given price per unit. 
Measured capacity is ex post and requires further definition, e.g. whether it is peak demand within a 
defined period or an average of several peaks. Measured capacity requires advanced smart metering 
and all Norwegian households are expected to have the advanced metering system in place by the 
beginning of 2019. This also enables the use of ToU tariffs, which signal peak demand, and is 
considered as a potential alternative to measured capacity.  
 
32 The case study on Norway is based on information from NVE (2016, 2017), CEER (2017) and European 
Commission (2017). 
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Models  Public consultation Household consumer  survey NVE 
Installed capacity • Indicates high capacity is more expensive than 
low capacity 
• Not very dynamic 
• Predictable in cost and revenue for customer 
and DSOs 
• Gives customers the scope to respond and 
influence their costs    
• Not a strong signal to reduce capacity demand  
• Perceived as inflexible  
• Lack of motivation to adjust 
behaviour  
• One may choose higher capacity 
than usually required to avoid 
power-cut situation  
Encourages DSOs to map customers’ installed 
capacity  
Subscribed capacity • Not obvious in incentivising efficient use of the 
network 
• Not preferred   
• Most appealing option to most of 
the survey participants  
• More comprehensible 
• Easy to relate to as similar to other 
subscriptions (e.g. mobile phone 
and broadband plans) 
Does not plan to amend regulations in order to 
facilitate tariffs based on subscribed capacity 
Measured capacity • Links directly consumer behaviour and bills  
• Best suited for capacity charging  
• Difficult to understand  
• Complex and unpredictable  
• Difficult to see implications  
• No one preferred  
Intends to provide clearer guidelines to 
standardise how the settlement basis and 
settlement periods for capacity charges are 
determined 
Time-of-Use • Easy to communicate to customers than the 
idea of maximum capacity  
• Simple for customers to relate to and thus 
change behaviour  
• Attractive  
• Relatively easy to calculate and verify 
profitability  
• Intuitive and coherent 
• Easy to understand and relate to   
• Not unanimously appealing to 
everyone  
• Unfair as punishes inflexibility over 
daily routine 
Intends to open up for ToU tariffs as an 
alternative to measured capacity charges 
Table A4. Consultation responses, consumer survey findings and NVE assessments regarding models of capacity charging
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In 2015, NVE launched a public consultation regarding the possible changes to the regulation for 
setting network tariffs for customers on low voltage supply (≤ 22 kV). The aim was to provide 
clearer guidelines for network tariff design, including the choice of capacity charging models. NVE 
also commissioned a survey on households’ attitudes and preferences over various models of 
designing the capacity component. Table A4 above collates the responses to public consultation, 
findings from the consumer survey, and NVE’s intentions with respect to implementing the four 
models. Note that the responses from the consumer survey differ from those voiced in the public 
consultation, where a proportion of contributions were from industry players with much better 
understanding of the capacity component than average household respondents.33 The contradictory 
preferences are highlighted in Table A4. 
California (PG&E)34 
Overview  
PG&E is a monopoly supplier to the northern part of California and is regulated by the California 
Public Utilities Commission. The regulator specifies revenue caps and PG&E determines network 
tariffs. Customers are broadly divided into residential and business classes, and in this case study, we 
focus entirely on tariffs for households. Household tariffs contain fixed and volume components, and 
for the  volume component both IBTs and ToU tariffs are available. 
A number of social and medical tariff schemes are in place. The California Alternate Rates for 
Energy (CARE) Program offers a discount of 20% or more on monthly bills of eligible and enrolled 
households. The Family Electric Rate Assistance (FERA) Program offers a discount on monthly bills 
for income-qualified households with three or more residents upon enrolment. The Medical Baseline 
Program provides financial assistance to households with special energy needs due to qualifying 
medical conditions. Any households with one or more residents who have a serious illness that could 
become life-threatening if energy service is disconnected upon non-payment can apply to become a 
Vulnerable Customer. 
Note that these social and medical schemes, as well as the various tariff plans outlined below, 
are available if household opt-in for them, so engagement and response from consumers are crucial.   
Key features in tariff components and charging bases  
California has a long history of using IBTs, also known as tiered rate structures, to charge volumetric 
electricity consumption. An IBT was established during the energy crisis in 2001, and in 2015, most 
households were on a four-block IBT. A new design of IBT was introduced in 2015 to provide 
households with a clearer understanding of consumption and a simpler interpretation of bills.  
The new design, as shown in Figure A1, has three blocks. Tier 1 is the baseline allowance, which 
is priced the lowest. A distinctive feature here is that the size of this allowance to some extent 
reflects household specifics, i.e. location and heating source, as well as the season, i.e. summer (May 
1 – October 31) or winter (November 1 – April 30). Tier 2 is then applied to consumption levels 
between 101% and 400% of the household’s own baseline and is priced at a higher level. Any 
consumption beyond tier 2, which is more than 400% of the baseline, is regarded as high usage and 
attracts a high use surcharge.  
 
33 The main documents of public consultation and summary, and consumer focus-group survey are only 
available in Norwegian. Table A4 is based on shorter English summaries of the main findings. We are unable to 
comment on issues related to methodology and process, and hence the robustness of the findings. 
34 The case study on PG&E is based on information available on PG&E’s website, especially under the section 
RESIDETIAL – RATE PLANS. 
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Figure A1. PG&E’s tiered rate plan (from PG&E website) 
PG&E offers three plans for ToU tariffs, with different peak hours. Prices also vary with season; 
the eight winter months have lower prices than the four summer months. ToU tariffs may also have 
a block structure. Under the first ToU plan, a baseline allowance equal to that under the IBT is 
included. Households enjoy a discount per kWh, known as the Baseline Credit, until the baseline 
allowance is reached. Households therefore have the opportunity to save more if they can reduce 
total volumetric consumption and shift consumption to off-peak hours.35 The second plan does not 
include any block structure, and the plan price is lower than the price after baseline allowance is 
reached under the first scheme. PG&E expects most households to have transitioned to a ToU plan 
by 2020.   
Besides the two charging bases, IBT and ToU, PG&E further provides “add-ons” that households 
can choose to enhance their base plans. With SmartRate add-on, households are offered a reduced 
price if they minimise their electricity consumption on especially hot days (≥ 96°F, called SmartDays) 
for a maximum of 15 days a year. This add-on is capacity-related and targets system demand peaks 
in hot weather. Enrolled households are notified the day prior to a SmartDay so that they can plan 
ahead to reduce consumption. PG&E claims that households can reduce their summer bills by up to 
20% on households’ summer bills through this scheme. 
Solar Choice Plan is another option, giving households the choice of having half or all of their 
electricity supplied from solar energy, even if they have not purchased and installed any solar PV 
themselves. This ‘go-clean’ option further allows households to choose whether they would like 
supplies from a pool of solar projects in Northern and Central California, or from a regional and 
specific project. This plan appears to be more inclusive as those who have not invested directly in 
self-generation are still able to contribute to, and gain benefits from, clean energy.  
These various tariff options can only achieve their design objectives if households actually opt-in 
to them. Fowlie et al. (2017) suggest that, while ToU tariffs have been found to reduce usage 
significantly during peak hours compared with tariffs that are not time-varying, the effect is much 
stronger for the group of households whose default tariff plan is ToU-based than the group of 
households who need to opt-in to a ToU tariff. This default effect, as they explain, is largely due to 
the inattention of consumers, and mirrors non-engagement from the energy market witnessed in 
Europe. 
Self-generation and net metering 
 
Households with self-generation are invoiced for their net usage under PG&E’S Net Energy Metering 
option. A special net meter is installed to measure the difference between the amount of self-
 
35 Information on PG&E’s Find you best rate plan page suggests the third ToU plan includes Baseline Credit as 
well, which is not clear from the Time-of-Use rate plans page. 
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generation by an enrolled household and the amount supplied by PG&E. The net meter is read 
monthly and the net usage appears as a credit or a charge, which accumulates over a 12-month 
billing cycle. During this cycle the household only needs to pay a non-energy service charge. At the 
end of the cycle the household will be issued a final balance.  
This option requires the household to be on a ToU tariff, and the monthly credits or charges 
reflect the ToU basis. When the household generates more electricity than the home requires, the 
surplus will be fed into the grid, and a ToU tariff means higher credit for a surplus fed into the grid 
during peak time. If at the end of a 12-month cycle the final balance of the household is in credit, the 
household will receive aNet Surplus Compensation, at a rate set by the regulator. 
 
Appendix III: Tables A5 and A6 
Tariff scenario Fixed 
component 
(€/year) 
Capacity 
component 
(€/kWh) 
Volume 
component 
(€/kWh) 
ToU 
100V - - 0.0842 NO 
100C - 30.7692 - NO 
100F 200 - - NO 
30F70V 60 - 0.0589 NO 
30F70C 60 21.5385 - NO 
50C50V - 15.3846 0.0421 NO 
20F40C40V 40 12.3077 0.0337 NO 
30F70Vt 60 - 0.0866 (peak) 
0.0173 (off-peak) 
YES 
Table A5. Tariff rates (when net metering is not available) 
 
Bill  100V 100C 100F 30F70V 30F70C 50C50V 20F40C40V 30F70Vt 
LL 3.41 0.00 0.00 2.39 0.00 1.71 1.37 0.61 
HL 3.41 0.00 0.00 2.39 0.00 1.71 1.37 0.74 
LH 12.52 0.00 0.00 8.76 0.00 6.26 5.01 2.23 
HH 12.52 0.00 0.00 8.76 0.00 6.26 5.01 2.72 
AA 7.97 0.00 0.00 5.58 0.00 3.98 3.19 1.42 
LvL 1.14 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.57 0.46 0.34 
HvL 1.14 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.57 0.46 0.34 
LvLf -42.11 0.00 0.00 -29.47 0.00 -21.05 -16.84 -8.39 
LL – low capacity, low consumption; HL – high capacity, low consumption; LH – low capacity, high consumption; HH – 
high capacity, high consumption; AA – average capacity, average consumption; LvL –  low capacity, very low 
consumption; HvL – high capacity, very low consumption; LvLf – low capacity, very low consumption, able to feed into 
the grid if allowed 
Table A6. Bill differences (€) due to net metering  
 
 
 
 
